The bear with the bomb: Russian nuclear coercion and the future of European deterrence

Summary — “The bear with the bomb: Russian nuclear coercion and the future of European deterrence” (ECFR, Rafael Loss & Katrine Westgaard, 17 June 2026)

This major policy brief examines how Russia is expanding its nuclear-capable long-range weapons and building a “theory of victory” aimed at fracturing NATO, extracting concessions and confronting Europe without direct US involvement. Based on interviews with over two dozen officials and experts across Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden, it finds Europeans see nuclear deterrence as essential but are unevenly prepared, with growing doubts about US reliability pushing renewed attention to Britain’s and France’s nuclear forces, including Macron’s “forward deterrence” proposal and the UK’s return to NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission. Country profiles reveal divergent postures — Poland debating its own nuclear ambitions and nuclear-sharing role, the Baltics and Nordics prioritizing NATO cohesion, Germany deepening Franco-German nuclear dialogue, and the Netherlands pushing to make NATO’s nuclear posture more visible. The paper recommends Europe build an “integrated strategic deterrence posture” over the next decade combining: nuclear flexibility (e.g., a joint UK-French low-yield nuclear cruise missile); conventional long-range strike capabilities to threaten “punishment” retaliation; improved air and missile defence (with AI-enabled, networked architecture); and closing a severe ISR/intelligence gap with the US (Europe has just 3 SIGINT aircraft versus America’s 17, and lacks autonomous space-based ISR). It calls for a European “strategic posture group,” a centre of excellence for deterrence doctrine, and a “Euro Eyes” intelligence-sharing initiative, all coordinated through NATO’s Joint Force Commands rather than a parallel EU structure.

Russia is expanding its nuclear-capable, long-range weapon systems to press Europe and fracture NATO. Europeans need to plug the gaps in their nuclear capabilities and create a strategic deterrent that can function without US support

Source: ECFR Publications · June 17, 2026