Behind the curve: Britain’s defence investment plan in Trump’s world

Summary — “Behind the curve: Britain’s defence investment plan in Trump’s world” (ECFR, Nick Witney, 3 July 2026)

Nick Witney assesses Britain’s newly published Defence Investment Plan (DIP) against three tests, growing more critical at each step. On matching the Russian threat, the plan gets partial credit for prioritizing cyber/electromagnetic defence and drone investment, but Witney flags a glaring gap: it concludes integrated air and missile defence can only be delivered through NATO, offering no plan for surging UK/European air-defence missile production despite the drone incident that brought down Latvia’s government in May. On reflecting the lessons of Ukraine, he argues the DIP fails to grasp the “radical transformation” of warfare toward sensor networks, AI-assisted battle management, and rapid software/hardware iteration cycles, instead still funneling most investment into legacy big-ticket platforms (Tempest, the nuclear deterrent, AUKUS submarines, helicopters) — “hybridisation” rather than genuine transformation. On adapting to a Trump-altered world, Witney is most damning: the plan still calls the US Britain’s closest ally and doubles down on buying more American F-35s carrying US nuclear bombs whose software Washington controls (including a rumored “kill switch”), even as continental Europe moves toward strategic autonomy and “buy European” defence procurement. He contrasts this establishment inertia with recent ECFR polling showing British public opinion is well ahead of policymakers — trusting Europe over America and prioritizing European defence cooperation (63% vs. 19% for the US) — suggesting incoming PM Andy Burnham has more political room to shift course than the defence establishment assumes.

The new defence investment plan is weighed down by the habits of Britain’s defence establishment. By contrast, the British public appear readier to accept change.

Source: ECFR · July 3, 2026