Unconventional deterrence: How Europe can ward off a Russian attack

Summary — “Unconventional deterrence: How Europe can ward off a Russian attack” (ECFR, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, 2 July 2026)

Ahead of NATO’s Ankara summit, the article argues that Europe must stop assuming nuclear deterrence alone keeps it safe from Russia. Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia are teaching Vladimir Putin that high-intensity war involving a nuclear-armed state can happen below the nuclear threshold, and Guéhenno warns European leaders against making the mirror-image mistake of assuming NATO’s nuclear umbrella shields them from hybrid or conventional attack. He examines French president Macron’s “forward deterrence” concept — deploying French nuclear weapons elsewhere in Europe — noting it is mainly symbolic and does not replace the US umbrella. The piece highlights the risk that Russia, facing setbacks in Ukraine, could resort to hybrid or limited conventional attacks (missiles, drones, sabotage) against NATO states supporting Kyiv, similar to warnings raised by Latvian intelligence. The core recommendation: Europe needs a “continuum of deterrence” that blends conventional long-range strike capability with nuclear deterrence, better coordination between nuclear (UK, France) and non-nuclear European states, and closer alignment with Washington — rather than treating nuclear deterrence and conventional defense as separate silos. ecfr

A nuclear deterrent does not preclude major war. Putin has learnt this lesson—now Europe needs to do the same.

Source: ECFR · July 2, 2026
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